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SALES
IMPLIED FOOD WARRANTIES- NECESSITY OF PRIVrTY OF
CONTRACT
Plaintiff sustained injuries by eating a liver pudding containing
Crat dung," the food being purchased by plaintiff's mother from a
retail dealer to whom the food had been sold by the defendant manu-
facturer. The case came to the Supreme Court of Ohio on a motion to
quash a service of summons, which motion the court upheld by finding
neither joint tort liability nor contract liability, the latter being due to
a lack of privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant
manufacturing company. Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, i3o Ohio
St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935). This case, although decided on a point
of procedure, is of extreme importance because of its strong dictum
which makes privity of contract essential in such suits between con-
sumer and manufacturers of impure foods. There are no Supreme
Court decisions, directly ruling on this subject in Ohio.
In Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E.
557, motion to certify record overruled in 26 O.L. Rep. 189 (1928),
the court held that where a purchaser was injured by a needle found
in bread which he ate, recovery would be allowed against the manu-
facturer, for his implied warranty extended to the ultimate consumer
without the necessity of a contractual relationship. This view is ad-
mitted by Judge Levine in the Trizzino case, supra, to be in the
minority, although many recent cases have supported it. Coca Cola
Bottling Works v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479 (1930);
Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. Jensen, 119 Tex. 447, 32 S.W. (2d)
227 (i93o); Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Sup. Ct.
515, I56 Adt. 537 (1931); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189
Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (192o) ;Mazetti v. Armour Co., 75 Wash.
622, 135 P. 633 (1913). The majority of the courts still regard
privity of contract as an essential requirement for recovery upon implied
warranty of foods. Chvsky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139
N.E. 576 (1923); Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249,
161 Atd. 385 (1932); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Ad.
186 (1925); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.
(2d) 701 (193o); Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn.
545, 179 S.W. 155 (1915).
In those states dispensing with privity of contract as a requirement
for recovery on implied warranty the courts are not in accord with
each other as to who may recover from the manufacturer. Some allow
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recovery only to the purchaser consumer. Rhodes v. Libby, McNeill,
& Libby, 133 Ore. 128, 288 P. 207 (193o); Binion v. Sasaki, 5 Cal.
App. (2d) I5, 41 P. (2d) 585 (1935). Others allow recovery to
to those for whose benefit the article was bought. Cassini v. Curtis
Candy Co., 113 N.J.L. 9I, 172 At. 519 (1934). Still others to the
donee of the purchaser. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss.
877, 111 Co. 305 (1927). In the Trizzino case the court stated that
the manufacturer was liable to the "ultimate consumer," but since
the purchaser was the plaintiff it was not necessary for the court to make
so broad a statement. While the injured party in the Canton provision
Co. case, supra, was a member of the purchaser's family, it is doubtful
whether the case can be distinguished on that point. The doctrine, at
least, should be extended to permit recovery in favor of the family of
the purchaser. Sed quaere, whether it should be extended to include
guests and donees.
The development of the warranty action shows a cause for the
confusion surrounding recovery on such theory. Warranty in its early
stages was in tort and recovery was held by an action on the case in
deceit. With the case of Stuart v. Wilkins, I Dougl. I8 (1778), an
action of assumpsit was permitted for recovery in warranty. Street,
"Foundation of Legal Liability," Vol. I, p. 389. "The confusion of
thought as to the nature of the obligation seems to be in great meas-
ure due to the allowance in modern times of this remedy (assumpsit)
for the breach of any warranty, whether in reality constituting a con-
tract or only a representation." 3,Wrilliston, "Contracts" sec. 1505.
It has been said, "The statement that a warranty is necessarily a con-
tractual obligation . . . defines an arbitrary limitation imposed by courts
. . . not resting upon necessities of logic but upon a conception of policy
• . . though sound should be open to exception." 42 Harvard L.R. 416
(Jan. 1929). Decisions allowing declarations in tort without alleging
scienter are still permissible. Erie City Iron Works v. Barber & Co.,
io6 Pa. 125 (884); Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass.
271, 84 N.E. 481 (907). These cases do not follow the early author-
ity for recover), in tort but recognize the fact that warranty is a hybrid
between tort and contract. Williston, "Contracts," supra. In pleading
the warranty, the allegations may be framed in two counts, one in
contract and one in tort, and a forced election of the counts is error.
Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., I89 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382
(1920); Bark v. Dixon, 115 Minn. 172, 131 N.W. 1078 (1911).
Thus if the warranty action is in contract, no duty can arise save
towards persons who are parties to the contract. "But the modern
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tendency is to make the fundamental nature of the obligation the test
as to whether the action is founded upon either tort or contract. If the
obligatioh is one imposed by law, either to act or to refrain from action
• . . in order to prevent probable injury to others, the obligation is
fundamentally one in the law of torts." Bohlen, "Studies in the Law of
Torts," pp. 86-7. This is the type of obligation owed by the manu-
facturer to the public, the breach of which should make him liable in
tort on the implied warranty of the fitness of his food. This tort action
is to be distinguished from the one that is usually allowed the injured
party for the manufacturer's breach of duty in negligence. The former
is predicated on implied warranty and requires no privity of contract
or showing of particular negligence of the manufacturer.
However, the view of the majority does not recognize this hybrid
nature of the warranty action, or if it does, they disregard it and allow
recovery solely on contractual principles. When the food is resold by
a dealer, there is no contractual relationship between the manufacturer
and consumer to which an implied warranty in respect to the food can
attach. Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. I, 179 S.E.
30 (1935). The warranty of quality of a chattel has usually been held
not to run with the chattel on its resale, and hence is not available to
the sub-vendee. Burns v. Baldwun-Doherty Co., 132 Me. 321, 170
Aft. 5 11 (1934); contra, Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, supra.
In a direct sale from the manufacturer to the consumer the manufac-
turer is held liable in warranty for selling unwholesome food because
the required privity element is present. Kroger Baking Co. v. Schneder,
249 Ky. 29 0933), 6o S.W. (2d) 594. The Kentucky Court recog-
nized that the consequences of the purchase may be so disastrous to the
health of the consumer that the public safety demands that there be an
implied warranty imposed upon the vendor that the article is fit for
human consumption. If that reasoning is accepted, there should be no
difference in liability because the purchaser was a sub-vendee of the same
article instead of a direct purchaser from the manufacturer. Blood
Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, io S.E. 118 (1889). Especially so
when the food is in cans, bottles, or sealed packages and neither the
dealer nor the sub-vendee has an opportunity to inspect. Curtiss Candy
Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 130 So. 479 (1930). The ultimate
contemplated destination is human consumption and the manufacturer
knows this. Hertzler v. Menshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N;W. 155
(1924).
Radio, billboards, and printing presses create a demand for the
manufacturer's product. This advertising is aimed at the ultimate con-
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sumer. The consumer should not be prevented from recovering because
of the lack of contractual relationship when the manufacturer, by his
representations, made with the intent that they be relied upon by the
consumer, has created a market for his product. Baxter v. Ford Motor
Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932). Express warranties
of a product may be found by the advertisement of its qualities in news-
papers. Baumgartner v. Glesener, 171 Minn. 289, 214 N.W. 27
(1927). The manufacturer also impliedly warrants that the product is
wholesome for human consumption when he puts it on the market for
sale. Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L. 748, 70 Adt. 314
(19o8). Because an express warranty has been made by the manufac-
turer, a warranty by implication will not thereby be excluded. Both, if
not inconsistent, may exist together. Baumgartner v. Glessner, supra;
Uniform Sales Act. Sec. I5(6). This approach is comparable to the
almost forgotten action of deceit on implied warranty, based on plain-
tiff's reliances on deceitful appearances or representations rather than on
a promise. I Williston, "Sales" sec. 242 (2nd ed. 1924). Actions
based on negligence are permitted for misrepresentations of the product
although the decisions are couched in terms of implied warranties.
Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 P. 202 (1914); Goldman
& F. Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 Ad. 866 (1922).
Cases have allowed recovery on implied warranty without privity of
contract, basing their arguments on public policy and social security.
Cantani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Ad. 931 (1915); Chenault
v. Houston Coca Cola Bottling Co., 151 Miss. 366, 118 So. 177
(1 9 28); Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 762
(1933). The Trizzino case, supra, regarded the contract between the
manufacturer and the retailer as one for the benefit of the consumer.
Finding an implied warranty between manufacturer and retailer is
finding a warranty for the consumer. See the dissent in Thomason v.
Ballard & Ballard Co., 170 S.E. 30 (N.C., 1935) at p. 34. The justi-
fication is concisely stated in the following summation: "When it is
realized that a warranty obligation is not necessarily promissory but may
often be independently imposed by law where found socially advan-
tageous, it is clear that arguments against the expansion based merely
on the absence of contractual relations are far from convincing that the
expansion is wrong." Vold, "Sales" p. 476.
Courts have sometimes evaded the question by finding negligence.
Norfolk Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Krause, I62 Va. 107, 173 S.E.
497 (1934). But the difficulty in food cases is to prove the negligence;
therefore, they raise presumptions favoring the injured petitioner.
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Some courts say the manufacture of impure foods makes the manufac-
turer prima facie negligent. Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 269 Pa. 114, 145 At. 700 (1929); Campbell Soup Co.
v. Davis, 207 N.C. 256, 175 S.E. 743 (1934). Others call a proper
case for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Collins Baking
Co. v. Savage, 227 Ala. 408, 150 So. 336 (933); Gainesville Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Stewart, 5 1 Ga. App. Io2, 179 S.E. 734 (i935);
contra, Enloe v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 18o S.E. 582
(1935). Although these aids favor the injured parties, they are not
adequate for full protection. The manufacturer still avoids the liability
by rebutting the presumptions. This he is unable to do when sued upon
implied warranty in the states where a contractual relationship is not
required. The risk is thus placed upon the person best able to avoid the
injury-the manufacturer.
The dictum in the Canton Provision case, supra, must not be under-
estimated, for the Supreme Court overruled the appellate court which
expressly held the Provision Co. liable upon the authority of the Triz-
zino case, supra. One cannot deny that the Trizzino case is in step with
the advance of the modern economic and manufacturing world of today
and should be supported. The Supreme Court of Ohio should seriously
consider such contentions when called upon to decide the merits of the
dictum in the Canton Provision Co. case, requiring privity of contract
between consumer and manufacturer of unwholesome food and the
Trizzino case dispensing with such requirement.
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TORTS
VIOLATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS BY MOTORCYCLE
POLICEMAN - NEGLIGENCE PER SE - EXPRESS AND IM-
PLIED EXEMPTION
Plaintiff, a motorcycle policeman in the city of Toledo, while in
pursuit of a violator of the speed laws was injured in a collision with
the defendant's automobile. Plaintiff was operating his cycle at the
speed of 65 miles per hour and crashed into the defendant when the
latter made a left-hand turn at an intersection without signalling, as
required by a city ordinance. The court charged the jury that if the
plaintiff were found to be exceeding the speed limit prescribed by Ohio
General Code, Section 12603 and Ordinance 4034 of the City of
Toledo, Section 45, relating to speed limits, such violation constituted
